Two recent publications in Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology (ACN) have been used by defense attorneys as the centerpiece for an argument that only a 'fixed' battery approach, exemplified by the Halstead-Reitan battery (HRB), satisfies the Daubert criteria for admissibility; and therefore, the HRB represents the only method of forensic neuropsychological assessment that should be admitted into evidence. Since this case has important implications for the practice of clinical neuropsychology in the United States, this 'Motion to Exclude' and its rationale are presented, which demonstrates how the legal profession uses neuropsychological literature. The critical issues of this argument for clinical neuropsychological practice are reviewed.
Forensic neuropsychology and the 'fixed' battery: challenges to the practice of clinical neuropsychology
The 2003 Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology (ACN) article by Hom asks: "Forensic Neuropsychology: Are we there yet?" An apropos question, since survey studies of the last 15 years clearly demonstrate the ascendancy of forensic work in the clinical practice of neuropsychology (Kanauss, Schatz, & Puente, 2005; Sweet, King, Malina, Bergman, & Simmons, 2002; Sweet, Moberg, & Suchy, 2000; Sweet, Nelson, & Moberg, 2006) . Indeed, the topic of forensic neuropsychology has become commonplace in both journal and text (Heilbronner, 2004 (Heilbronner, , 2005 Larrabee, 2005) . As such, there can be little debate that forensics has become a very important part of contemporary clinical neuropsychology.
Implications of a professional standard in the forensic practice of clinical neuropsychology could be construed from the Hom (2003) article, implications that potentially have broad reaching inferences for the entire practice of clinical neuropsychology and forensic applications of neuropsychology in the United States. Hom (2003) puts forth the argument that the 'fixed-battery' approach using the original Halstead-Reitan battery (HRB, Reitan, 1955a,b) passes the legal Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals standard (see Faigman & Monahan, 2005) and, therefore, may be the only set of neuropsychological tests that reach an admissible standard within a legal setting. If following a 'Daubert' challenge the court ruled that only HRB data as a 'fixed' battery approach were admissible for a neuropsychologist to base her/his opinions that could have far-reaching implications for the practice of neuropsychology. Such instances have begun to occur (see McKinzey & Ziegler, 1999; Reed, 1996; Stern, 2001) . If accepted, any 'flexible' battery approach (see Benton, 1992) would not be permissible. This position has recently been articulated by Russell, Russell, and Hill (2005) in a review also published in ACN where they state, "In summary, in forensic situations, the expert witness using a standardized battery is the only [italics added] psychologist who can provide dependable testimony interpreting psychometric test data as a whole to the court. The expert witness who utilizes a flexible battery cannot [italics added] provide dependable evidence derived from the battery as a whole . . . (p. 792)." Thus, the issue raised by Hom (2003) , and added upon by Russell et al. (2005) statements, could be used as the centerpiece for a legal argument to exclude testimony on neuropsychological test results except for those based on a 'fixed-battery approach' (i.e., the HRB). Indeed these publications have recently been used in a 'Motion to Exclude' psychological and neuropsychological testimony using the very arguments put forth by these authors.
Understanding how the legal profession utilizes neuropsychological publications and how legal arguments are crafted from the writings of neuropsychologists has been a topic rarely addressed in the neuropsychological literature. However, what legal practitioners do with published neuropsychological research and writing has far reaching implications for the practice of clinical neuropsychology in the United States if aspects of neuropsychological practice are restricted by courts. How the lay public and legal profession interprets neuropsychological literature may be far different than the original intent of the neuropsychological publication. Much of traditional neuropsychological research has been done in the context of the scientist-practitioner model addressing both basic and applied research issues of importance to clinical neuropsychology. However, when the audience is no longer comprised of neuropsychologists and the debate moves over to the legal arena, with completely different standards and rules, how neuropsychological publications are interpreted and used for legal purposes becomes a very different objective. In a legal setting, various rules of procedure apply as to what the court decides is admissible for a jury to review. One legal maneuver that attorney's can use is the 'Motion to Exclude'.
Since this legal maneuver was an attempt to regulate what is permissible for a jury to hear from a neuropsychologist, it is informative to read some of the actual legal positions and writings of this petition to exclude. The issue in this report is not the neuropsychological findings in the case, which will not be offered or discussed but rather the 'legal' admissibility of a flexible battery approach to clinical assessment of a patient with medically documented neurological abnormalities, including abnormal neuroimaging findings, thereby objectively documenting presence of underlying 'brain damage'. This article will center solely on how neuropsychological literature was used by attorneys in an attempt to exclude neuropsychological testimony based on a flexible neuropsychological assessment approach. I was the retained expert by the plaintiff. The patient had a treating clinical psychologist as well. Both of us used a flexible battery approach in evaluating this patient. The defense-retained neuropsychologist administered the original HRB, using the original HRB cut-off scores, and argued that only the HRB findings were reliable and that the tests based on a flexible battery approach had never been properly validated and therefore, "not reliable".
The 'Daubert' challenge: the rules of scientific evidence according to the 'Motion to Exclude' petitioners
The essence of the challenge and what is relevant to the practice of clinical neuropsychology can be summarized with a few verbatim excerpts used by the defense in their motion to preclude all neuropsychological testimony by the plaintiffs. The practice of law is regulated at various levels within a state as well as federally and each has its interpretation of the 'Daubert' standard (Cwik & North, 2004; Faigman & Monahan, 2005) . Thus different reference cases may be mentioned in what follows, but they all go back to what has been commonly called the 'Daubert' standard. It should also be noted that despite the simplicity of the argument contained herein, the issues are complex (see Lakoff, 2005) and it is infrequent that exclusions actually occur that restrict a psychologists testimony (see Dahir et al., 2005) .
Verbatim reproductions of the defendant's motion to exclude
2.1.1. Standards ". . . Rules of Evidence requires that expert testimony be both relevant and reliable. If it is not relevant, or more to the point of this motion, not reliable it cannot be of assistance to the trier of fact. E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Robinson, 923 S.W. 2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995) . The Supreme Court noted the influence of professional expert witnesses in litigation involving complex subjects and expressed concern about the potential for prejudice in admitting unreliable "scientific" testimony. Id. at 553. Expert witnesses can have an extremely prejudicial impact on the jury in part because of the way in which the jury perceives an expert as an unbridled authority figure. Id. Added to the potentially prejudicial influence of the term "expert" is the difficulty in evaluating scientific evidence. Id. In light of the increased use of experts and the likely prejudicial impact of their testimony, trial judges have been given a heightened responsibility -i.e. the role of gatekeeper -to ensure that expert testimony has the requisite indicia of reliability. Id. It is especially important that trial judges scrutinize proffered evidence for scientific reliability when it is based on novel scientific theories or "junk" science. Id. at 554.
The trial court is charged as the gatekeeper of expert testimony; in performing that function the court should examine expert testimony in light of the following factors:
1. the extent to which the expert's methodology has been or can be tested; 2. the extent to which the technique relies on the subjective interpretation of the expert; 3. whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; 4. the technique's potential rate of error; 5. whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; 6. the non-judicial uses that have been made of the theory or technique.
Id. at 557. Factors (1), (3), (4) and (5) all require the employment of the scientific method for testing a hypothesis and acceptance of an expert's theory within the scientific community, while factors (2) and (6) are aimed at the expert's credibility, and particularly whether the expert's opinions were generated solely for litigation.
To date, the . . . State Supreme Court has synthesized the case law by finding the following:
1. A two part test governs whether expert testimony is admissible a. The expert must be qualified; b. The testimony must be relevant and based on a reliable foundation. 2. The expert must truly have expertise concerning the actual subject matter about which they are offering an opinion.
If an expert relies on unreliable foundational data, any opinion drawn from that data is likewise, unreliable. 3. An expert's testimony is unreliable even when the underlying data is sound, if the expert's methodology is flawed. 4. Scientific evidence which is not grounded in the methods and procedures of science is no more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Unreliable evidence is of no assistance to the trier of fact and, therefore, inadmissible under Rule 702. Chemical v. Williams, 47 S.W. 3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001) . Once the party opposing the expert testimony objects to an expert's testimony, the proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of demonstrating its admissibility. Robinson, 923 S.W. 2d at 557. The court must serve as a gatekeeper and examine expert testimony once the issue of reliability has been raised. Id. If the methodology of an expert's opinion is flawed, it is irrelevant that an expert's opinion is anecdotally correct.
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Background on neuropsychological testing
Neuropsychology is a science. The reliability of neuropsychological testimony must be based on the appropriate methodology employed to support the opinions of the neuropsychologist. Because neuropsychology is a science, the underlying data, i.e. neuropsychological testing, must be validated to demonstrate the causation, location, type and extent of impaired brain function in order to be admissible in Texas courts. Robinson, 923 S. W. 2d at 553. The neuropsychologist must use a methodology that has been scientifically validated on brain-impaired individuals and can distinguish various brain conditions from each other as well as from normal variation. The methodology must be able to determine whether any dysfunction found is, in fact, the result of a neurological condition as opposed to a non-neurological, psychological or even factitious disorder. Hom (2003) attached here to as exhibit. . . When it comes to neuropsychological testing, reliability equals validity. There are two different types of neuropsychological test batteries: (1) the fixed battery and (2) and the flexible battery. One is scientifically validated (the fixed battery), while the other, by definition, cannot be scientifically validated (the flexible battery). Unless the neuropsychologist's choice of test batteries is scientifically validated for the purpose of specifically demonstrating the causation of cognitive deficits, their opinions cannot meet the reliability standards of scientific methodology. . .
The fixed battery or "Validated" battery
Fixed battery testing requires that the neuropsychologist utilize a set of tests which have been individually validated and validated in relationship to each other to assess cause, location, nature and extent of brain function on brain impaired individuals. The only such validated test is the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery (HRB). The battery has been validated in blind studies to be determinative of brain injury. Reitan and Wolfson (2004) attached hereto. . .
The flexible battery
The flexible battery, by its very definition, however, can never be validated. The flexible battery is a battery in which the practitioner takes the referral question, develops a hypothesis, and then designs tests that the practitioner believes will prove or disprove the hypothesis. Because each patient is tested by a different combination of tests, by definition, the interrelationship can never be validated or scientifically studied against control groups to demonstrate brain injury. The available scientific literature demonstrates this fact, stating that "due to the wide variations in flexible batteries, no reliability of data is currently available." Gary Groth-Marnet, Neuropsychological Assessment in Clinical Practice, 16 (2000) attached hereto . . . It is undisputed in neuroscience that flexible batteries are not validated.
The flexible battery is the kind of methodology that is so reliant on subjectivity that it cannot pass muster as the reliability standards. . . Robinson, 923 S.W. 2d at 557. In such testing, the patient describes subjective complaints and relates them back to an event. The practitioner then takes the referral question and then chooses tests that support that hypothesis. The tests then attempt to prove the hypothesis solely initiated by the subjective complaints of the patient. The flexible battery, then, is not only not validated, but relies extensively on the subjective reporting by claimants in a lawsuit. This method is even more scientifically suspect in light of studies which have shown that patients complaining of cognitive deficits severely under-report pre-morbid cognitive problems. Lees-Haley, Williams, and English (1996) attached hereto. . ."
Discussion
If the reader reviews Hom (2003) and Russell et al. (2005) together it is apparent that several of the preceding statements used by the defense attorneys to generate the 'Motion to Exclude' were taken verbatim or almost verbatim from those two articles. Clearly, what may be targeted for a clinical neuropsychological audience is read and used by the legal profession with potentially very different intentions. Hopefully, clinical neuropsychology's objective has been to advance the science of human brain-behavior relationships within a framework of assessment, diagnosis and treatment of brain related disorders using a variety of methods to reliably assess neurobehavioral function. In the legal arena, the attorney is given the charge of representing his or her client and their side of the case, with all of the resources they can bring to bear with the purpose to prevail for their client and side of the legal argument (i.e., to win)-a very different purpose than that of a clinical specialty within psychology. The plaintiff attorneys requested that I assist in rebutting this argument. My opinions on this are expressed below and formed the basis of the information used by the plaintiff side to refute this argument.
Clinical neuropsychology has a rich and scientific history on the use of clinical observation as well as normative data to make inferences about scores (or behaviors) that deviate on a particular task and how such findings may relate to brain function or dysfunction (Heilman & Valenstein, 2003; Lamberty, 2003; Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004; Mitrushina, Boone, Razani, & D'Elia, 2005; Spreen & Strauss, 1998; Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006) . Arthur Benton once lectured on this very topic (see Benton, 1992) , a debate that was part of our early neuropsychological heritage, but the idea of a 'fixed' battery as the only method for neuropsychology is, in my opinion, truly passé by today's practice standards (as an example, see Randolph, 2002) . Clinical neurological science and practice does not rely on neuropsychological testing to 'diagnose brain damage' like it once did (i.e., 'organicity' versus functional disorder). It relies on neuropsychology to accurately describe a patient's behavior and cognitive status and to utilize standardized measures that depict a level of function that permits diagnosis and monitoring of a patient's neurobehavioral status (Randolph, 2002) . While the HRB may be the prototype of the fixed-battery approach, it was developed in a different era with different purposes. This is aptly stated by American Academy of Neurology in a report from their 'Therapeutics and Technology Assessment Subcommittee (1996)' where they addressed the issue of "neuropsychological testing of adults." In this position paper it states the following: "The Halstead-Reitan Battery was developed specifically to detect "organic" dysfunction and differentiate between patients with and without brain damage (e.g., to distinguish "organic" from "functional" disorders). Differential diagnosis of neurologic disorders or precise delineation of the underlying neuronal systems affected was not intended. Newer tests designed in concert with evolving information regarding the mediation of behavior by specific structures or circuits provide greater insight into the integrity or disintegration of neurologic function (p. 592)." In support of how universal these contemporary changes are, a recent survey (see Rabin, Barr, & Burton, 2005) demonstrates that less than 15% of neuropsychologists employ a strict 'fixed' battery approach while an even more recent survey indicates that the number may actually be less (Sweet et al., 2006) .
There is also another curious argument brought out by this motion to limit neuropsychological testimony to only those findings associated with the fixed-HRB approach and the research cited in this motion. The argument that the HRB is the only assessment battery standardized with a suitable 'brain damage' group actually refers back to the original standardization of the HRB dating back to the 1950s (see Reitan, 1955a,b) . I would like the reader (and any future court where this may be argued) to think about what has been accomplished in clinical neuroscience over the past 50 years and then reflect back on this argument. The original HRB standardization that is referred to in this motion is from the beginning era of modern neuroscience, where the 'brain damaged' group was physician defined by the standards of that era (see Reitan & Davison, 1974) , an era that long predated contemporary neurodiagnostics advanced by neuroimaging and clinical neuroscience (Schmahmann, 2004) . While the motion contains a more recent HRB reference (i.e., Reitan and Wolfson, 2004 ) the reader should not assume that a more recent reference provides updated standardization using new neurodiagnostic techniques (i.e., brain imaging), because as one traces references back to patient groupings in these publications, it is apparent that much of it goes back to the earlier publications of the 1950s and 1960s. Russell et al. (2005) do review additional normative approaches to the HRB, but with the same assumption that the HRB represents the 'gold standard' for the 'fixed battery' approach to neuropsychological assessment and that other tests have to be co-normed with the 'gold standard'. In the case that was the basis for this 'Motion to Exclude', the original HRB norms based on the original standardization of the HRB (see Reitan & Davison, 1974) , with set 'cut-points' were the HRB standards used by the defense-retained neuropsychologist.
This legal argument, using the Hom (2003) and Russell et al. (2005) statements, if taken at face value, would have excluded all of the so called flexible neuropsychological tests, approaches and comprehensive additional norms-including age, education and demographically adjusted norms (see Heaton, Grant, & Matthews, 1991; Lucas et al., 2005; Manly, 2005) . Acceptance of the Hom (2003) and Russell et al. (2005) positions also ignores all of the clinical practice methods used by neuropsychologists involving interview, observation, clinical inference, neuropsychological screening measures and testing of mental status (Strub & Black, 1981) .
Another focus of this motion hones in on the issue of subjective complaints and that a patient's self report is unreliable. The very nature of neuropsychological assessment and evaluation, of course, begins with a patient's history and clinical presentation. Unlike certain fields of medicine, where a specific test may provide a definitive diagnosis (i.e., a positive biopsy that defines a specific type of cancer), given the nature of neurobehavioral disorders, neuropsychology simply does not have that specificity. The basic assumption in neuropsychology is that prior to the onset of a particular disorder or injury, a given individual's basic cognitive and emotional abilities are functioning within some baseline level rooted in their constitutional makeup, genetic endowment, educational and vocational experience as well their age and sex. Some vulnerability factors are often present (i.e., prior depression, previous injury, etc.) when someone becomes symptomatic for a disease or disorder. With that baseline information, when a given injury or illness occurs, neuropsychological sequelae, should they be present, do so in a deviation from that patient's background and baseline ability level (see Lamberty, 2003; Lezak et al., 2004) . 'Subjective' symptoms are often why a patient seeks medical, psychological and neuropsychological services and why a medical specialist may refer a patient for a neuropsychological evaluation, and what may first direct a clinician in the evaluation and treatment of a patient. Subjective symptoms may be the first sign of what become objective neurological deficits (Cordonnier et al., 2006) .
Another issue raised in the 'Motion to Exclude' had to do with symptom base rates particularly as they relate to subjective symptoms of individuals involved in litigation, but the referenced research in support of this position is also problematic. Proper base-rate research would come from large prospective population-based samples where the researchers were independent in everyway concerning the outcome. There are very few studies in the neuropsychological literature that meet that standard. The defense attorneys in their motion to exclude used Lees-Haley et al. (1996) reference, but that publication is merely based on 34 cases involved in litigation, far from any criteria where proper base rates could be used.
Concluding statements
Major advancements in the use of clinical neuropsychological techniques in the assessment of a wide-range of neurobehavioral functions have occurred over the last 30 years. The so-called 'fixed battery' approach had a role in that history, but certainly cannot be considered the only reliable method in the assessment of cognitive and behavioral deficits associated with neurological impairment. Furthermore, given the current zeitgeist of the field of clinical neuropsychology, a fixed battery approach cannot utilize advancements of the ever-increasing information coming from contemporary neurodiagnostic, clinical neuroscience and/or cognitive neuroscience. Properly administered and interpreted flexible battery approaches do meet legal standards to form the basis of opinion for neuropsychologists involved in forensic work.
